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The Responsibility to  
Protect: Norm Development 
in a Liberal World Order
In the current century, there has been an interesting evolution of core values and 
principles guiding international political behavior. The development has taken 
place under the headline that governments have a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) 
their citizens against atrocities. The new set of principles are linked to the idea of 
‘responsible sovereignty’ stressing that states have a responsibility to protect their 
own citizens against serious crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The most remarkable aspect of the debate is the 
fact it has touched upon two of the fundamental building blocks in the current 
international system namely the sovereignty of states and the principle of non-
intervention in other states’ domestic affairs. The most controversial element in the 
emergence of new international norms is the call on the international community 
to intervene directly when a government is unable or unwilling to stop atrocities. 
Philipp Rotmann and others argue that the “debates around a responsibility to 
protect provide a unique opportunity to analyze the changing global order in a 
way that focuses on fundamental conflicts over sovereignty and 
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In the field of international development, the effectiveness of international 
democracy and governance aid1 continues to be a pertinent point of debate. The 
success of aid designated towards the democracy and governance sector is nearly 
always assessed using corruption indexes or commonplace measurements of democ-
racy such as Freedom House and Polity scores.2 While these methods are relatively 
effective at capturing the long-term structural perspective of regime change, more 
specific evaluation attempts of democracy and governance aid remain elusive. In 
order to provide an alternative approach, this paper first reviews literature relating 
to the effectiveness of democracy aid, and then examines public opinion data across 
sixteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to compare citizen 
[Cont’d, Page 3]
Linking Democracy Aid to Public 
Opinion Research: Findings from Sixteen 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
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• A Letter from the Director •
This concludes another busy year for the 
Democracy and Governance program. 
Earlier this year in May we graduated 
our 8th class. We are extremely proud of 
our students and offer them our warmest 
congratulations! They are moving on to 
do wonderful and exciting things, and 
reflect the diversity of background and 
interest that our program aims to attract. They are sure to 
succeed in anything they set their minds on. 
This past semester we have also continued to forge new 
partnerships and opportunities for our students. Earlier 
this year we concluded our inaugural USAID study group. 
Under the tutelage of Prof. Jeff Fischer five students success-
fully conducted in-depth research on the causes of election 
violence, and provided USAID with new tools for predicting 
and reacting to such occurrences. The fruits of their labor 
can be found here (https://government.georgetown.edu/
USAID). True to the quality of our program, our students 
did quite impressive work and this model of instruction is 
one that we aim to replicate with other U.S. government 
institutions. It is a real opportunity for students to combine 
an academic and practical learning experience. 
In January 2015 we convened our first meeting of the 
new Democracy and Governance Advisory Board. This is 
an important addition to our program, and we are happy 
to report that several of the most prominent figures in the 
fields of democracy promotion, governance reform, and 
international development have joined us. Joining us for our 
first term are Shari Bryan (Vice President, NDI), Thomas 
Garrett (Vice President IRI), Thomas Carothers (Carnegie 
Endowment), Larry Cooley (President, MSI), Eric Bjorn-
lund (Principal, DI), Beatriz Casals (Founder, Casals & 
Associates), and Amb. Donald J. Planty (President, Planty 
& Associates). The board is there to maintain our domestic 
and international profile, help ensure that our programming 
fits the job market needs, and to foster deeper partnerships 
between Georgetown and the practitioner sector. We are 
happy to have these fine individuals join our program.
This issue of Democracy and Society is dedicated to the 
topic of Democracy, International Actors, and Foreign Aid. 
Many date the inception of contemporary U.S. democracy 
assistance with the creation of the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) in 1983. Since, the democracy promotion 
(and governance reform) community has proliferated greatly 
in Washington D.C. and abroad. There are now dozens of 
organizations involved in training political parties, empow-
ering citizens, reforming electoral laws and procedures, and 
reforming legislatures. Improving democracy and govern-
ance is now a part of development vocabulary, and gradually 
part of discussions on national security as well.
Yet, the record on democracy assistance is a matter of 
some debate, and no minor amount of controversy. It has 
become all the more important given the perception of 
democratic backsliding, authoritarian resurgence, and global 
uncertainty. The 1990s were in many ways the heyday of 
democracy assistance following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. In the days following 
September 11, 2001, even though democracy assistance 
has become associated with regime change and external 
intervention, there has also been a greater focus on maintain-
ing stable relationships with non-democratic countries to 
maintain global security. Meanwhile, the rise of new powers 
like China and Russia limits the ability of Western donors 
to leverage countries into democratic reform. Democracy 
assistance funding has been subject to real budget cuts in 
recent years. 
We asked for submissions on the relationship between 
international actors, foreign aid, and democracy assistance. 
How has foreign aid and democracy assistance evolved? How 
effective has it been over the years? What are the current 
and future challenges the democracy promotion community 
faces? Our submissions for this edition include a thought 
provoking piece by Prof. Gorm Rye Olsen of Roskilde Uni-
versity in Denmark on the responsibility to protect. The 
rise of a power like China and its influence in arenas like 
sub-Saharan Africa is often cited as a reason that democracy 
promotion programs fail. Prof. Olsen argues for a more nu-
anced view, that analyzes the role of China (and other newly 
industrialized countries) within the context of a contested 
international order. 
Two of our articles come straight from the frontlines 
of democracy promotion. Paul Friesen of the National 
Democratic Institute uses opinion data from 16 Africa to 
examine the relationship between democracy assistance and 
tangible outcomes. He argues that aid channeled through 
civil society organizations leads to stronger public accept-
ance of democracy. Aisha Kibwana, also of the National 
Democratic Institute, uses the case study of Nigeria to argue 
that measures of success and failure ultimately need to be 
contextualized. Our other submissions include a piece by 
Ph.D. candidate Alessandro Badella (University of Genoa) 
on U.S. democracy promotion in Cuba, and a book review 
by Ph.D. candidate Erum Haider (Georgetown University) 
of M.A. Thomas’ book Govern Like Us: US Expectations of 
Poor Countries.
Finally I am pleased to announce that Democracy and 
Society itself has a new home. Our webpage has migrated to 
our main Georgetown page and can now be found at: https://
government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-society. The 
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responsibility, universalism and exceptionalism, hypocrisy 
and selectivity.”1 
This short article touches upon some of the reactions 
to the changes in the international norms mentioned.  The 
reactions of the European Union, the African Union and 
China are looked into in two steps. First the principled reac-
tions are described and second, the reactions to the actual 
implementation of the principles of the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ in the case of the NATO-led intervention in Libya 
in 2011 are dealt with. The reactions to the implementation 
are important because a number of commentators argue 
that the UN Security Council authorization to use “all nec-
essary means to protect the civilians” in the case of Libya 
was exploited by the ‘West’ to carry out a regime change in 
Libya. The critics maintain that because the Western powers 
stretched the UN mandate to include regime change, Russia, 
China and others have opposed the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect the civilian population in Syria.2
The responsibility to protect
Some of the issues involved in the evolution of the basic 
international norms and values were formally debated at the 
2005 UN World Summit. The changes in the international 
norms introduced by the UN summit are linked to the argu-
ment that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens 
(R2P) and that states therefore cannot do whatever they 
want to their own citizens protected by the dogma of state 
sovereignty and thus non-intervention into domestic affairs.3 
In 2006, the United Nations Security Council unani-
mously adopted resolution no. 1674 aimed at protecting 
civilians in armed conflict. The resolution explicitly referred 
to the important role that a regional organization, for exam-
ple the African Union can play to protect civilians. With the 
resolution, the so-called world society aimed at introducing 
a new norm in international politics by stressing the impor-
tance of protecting civilians against violations of their basic 
human rights. It was and still is highly controversial that 
resolution no. 1674 opened for the possibility that states 
under certain conditions may interfere in the internal affairs 
of other states in order to protect civilians against atrocities 
committed by their own state.
The rise of China: Conflict or cooperation 
Not only can the debates on the principles of R2P tell 
us about the developing global order. The implementation 
of the principles can, moreover hint at how a rising power 
like China is locating itself within this new order. In the 
current decade, China has been on rise globally including 
in Africa mainly due to the significant volume of its trade 
and its foreign investments. 
Two opposing views can be identified on what it means 
that China is becoming a world power. On the one hand, 
there is the view that the rise of China (and other so-called 
developing countries) inevitably leads to confrontation and 
conflict between the ‘West’ and the rising power(s) because 
their interests and strategies are incompatible. It is argued 
that the current order cannot be taken for granted simply 
because the newcomers on the global scene do not feel 
ownership to the prevailing institutions and to the prevail-
ing institutional order.4 
On the other hand, there is the argument that the rise of 
China (and others) does not necessarily lead to confrontation 
and conflict. It might as well result in increased cooperation 
between the great powers of the world simply because China 
will gradually accept and abide to the prevailing norms and 
rules governing the international system. These norms and 
rules are basically Western. John Ikenberry maintains that 
the Western order has a remarkable capacity to accom-
modate rising powers such as China. “The Western orders’ 
strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting 
to facilitate Chinese integration,” it is stated.5 
The EU, the AU, and the R2P
Traditionally, emphasizing the need to respect human 
rights and the concern for civilians in conflict situations are 
considered an expression of ‘Western’ values. Therefore, the 
idea of a Responsibility to Protect can be seen as an attempt 
to promote Western values and institutions globally. Fol-
lowing the World Summit in September 2005, it is hardly 
surprising that EU statements began to express strong sup-
port for the R2P. It became clear that the European Union 
supported an understanding of the implementation of the 
R2P outside Europe which implied the empowerment of lo-
cal actors. In relation to Africa, the position basically means 
that the EU should only play an auxiliary role and only in 
exceptional cases step in and temporarily fill the gap before 
the local actors or the UN can take over the responsibility 
to protect threatened civilians.6 Both the EU Commission 
and the member states have expressed the view that the best 
way of operationalizing the R2P is by preventing a conflict 
from escalating. 
As far as the African Union is concerned, the R2P is writ-
ten effectively into the AU’s founding treaty and basically 
the treaty is more in line with the notion of ‘responsible 
sovereignty’ than with the conventional emphasis on state 
Olsen, Continued from Page 3
new site will host our current issues, a full and easily acces-
sible archive of past issues. This will also be the home to our 
new blog, which will re-launch in the fall semester. Please 
check in with the site later this year. 
Yonatan L. Morse (Ph.D., Georgetown University) is the associate 
director of the Democracy and Governance program. 
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rights.7 At the same time, the localization of the R2P norm 
within the AU treaty goes hand in hand with the adherence 
to the principles of non-interference by non-African powers, 
which exists together with the duty of the Africans to take 
care of each other.8 
China and the R2P
In historical terms, China has been very firm when it 
came to issues of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention in domestic affairs. Beijing has strongly opposed 
any attempt to violate the sovereignty of states. This is exactly 
why it is so interesting how China has reacted to the R2P 
norms and not least to the implementation of these norms. 
In this context, it is relevant to stress that Beijing actually 
voted in favor of UN resolution 1674.
In general, the Chinese government has been supportive 
of the concept and the idea of a ‘Responsibility to protect’ as 
it was formulated at the 2005 World Summit. On the other 
hand, it is not to be neglected that China’s so-called ‘New 
Security Concept’ launched in 2002 stressed the respect 
for sovereignty especially in developing countries. Beijing 
also emphasized the requirement for the United Nations to 
play a “leading role in the settlement of disputes preferably 
through negotiations and reciprocity.”9 Sven Grimm argues 
that such arguments can be regarded as one of the strong sell-
ing points to African elites entering into a political dialogue 
with Beijing. Not least the principle of non-interference has 
a strong sounding board among African governing elites and 
therefore, it is also found in the provisions of the African 
Union side by side with the idea of ‘responsible sovereignty.’10 
In spite of the formulations in the ‘New Security Con-
cept,’ Beijing has altered its attitude since 2002 from no 
interventions at all to accepting interventions under certain 
conditions.  China has expressed serious concerns regarding 
human rights and on several occasions, it has taken steps to 
improve the human rights situation in countries in Africa.11 
The first time, the change of position manifested itself in 
Africa was in the acceptance of a UN Security Council resolu-
tion on Darfur. The Chinese abstention from voting during 
the Libya crisis also has to be mentioned as an illustration 
of China’s new stand in the debate of state rights versus the 
rights of civilians.12
The bottom line seems to be that the Chinese govern-
ment is developing a more and more open mind towards 
giving priority to protecting human rights and consequently 
accepting interventions under the strict precondition that 
it takes place under the framework of the UN.13 
The 2011 Libya war
When civilian protests appeared in several cities through-
out Libya in early 2011, the regime under Muammar Gaddafi 
clamped down hard on the protesters. The repression was 
so brutal that a number of Western powers felt they had to 
do something to protect the Libyan civilian population. The 
British and French decision-makers launched substantial 
R2P arguments in favor of an international intervention 
into Libya. 10 out of 15 members of the Security Council 
voted in favor of using “all necessary measures to protect 
civilians” which included the establishment of a no-fly zone 
for the Libyan air force. By abstaining from voting, China, 
Russia, Germany, India and Brazil in effect supported the 
resolution. Resolution 1973 specified the purpose of the 
military action as humanitarian protection and it limited 
the means to that specific goal. Nevertheless, NATO ignored 
the restrictions against targeting Gaddafi directly resulting 
in what has been described as regime change.14  
The outcome of the 2011 Libya intervention had sig-
nificant impact in many respects. One is that the Western 
powers in the NATO-led intervention are responsible for the 
mission creep from protection of civilians to regime change. 
And because of this change of goal, it has been impossible 
to reach international agreement about doing something 
seriously in the case of Syria. Another consequence of the 
Libya mission is that the three actors dealt with here reacted 
in different ways to the outcome of the Libya campaign.
Starting with the last topic, following the Libya crisis 
a number of African states indicated a greater reluctance 
towards supporting future UN resolutions authorizing the 
use of force by non-UN forces. Also, a re-strengthening of 
the principle of non-interference in relation to the norm 
of R2P seems to appear among African political leaders.15 
The same political positions were found when it later came 
to the crises in the Ivory Coast and Mali.16 Within Europe, 
the Libya crisis revealed strong ambivalences within the 
EU where some member states like Germany were very 
careful not to use the terminology of R2P whereas France 
and the UK were much more outspoken in favor of using 
R2P arguments.17 
There is no doubt that the Libya campaign had serious 
consequences for the Chinese attitudes towards the whole 
idea of R2P including controversial issues like intervention 
and state sovereignty. First of all, Beijing had a feeling of 
being deceived and betrayed by the Western powers be-
cause the mission against the Gaddafi-regime developed 
from protecting human rights and civilians to resulting in 
regime change. Chinese representatives even used words 
like ‘conspiracy’ or ‘trick’ describing the behavior of the 
three Western powers that are permanent members of the 
UN Security Council.18 In sum, the Libya war seems to 
have strengthened those who were skeptical about the new 
developments in international norms and principles.
Contours of a new international order
Alex Bellamy goes strongly against such an interpretation 
suggesting the Libyan crisis has had serious consequences 
for the prospects reaching international consensus on au-
thorization of armed intervention into the Syrian civil war.19 
First and foremost, China has never specifically pointed to 
concerns over Libya as a source of its decision to veto draft 
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UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. Second, impor-
tant emerging states like Brazil and India that were critical 
of the NATO operation in Libya have on several occasions 
voted in favor of draft resolutions on Syria. Third and in this 
context most importantly, the Security Council has used 
R2P arguments in resolutions more often after the Libya 
crisis than during the years 2005 to 2011.20 References to 
the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ were used in no less than 5 
crisis situations after the adoption of resolution 1976. It 
was done in relation to Cote d’Ivoire (2011), South Sudan 
(2011), Yemen (2011), Mali (2012) and the Central African 
Republic (2013).
Summing up, Philipp Rothman and others argues that 
the debates on R2P provide us with an entrance to under-
standing the emerging global order and the conflicts and 
different interests within this order. No doubt, there are 
still deep divisions between the leading states which the 
Syrian tragedy so clearly emphasizes.  On the other hand, 
it is important to stress that the intervention in Libya did 
not stop the evolution of new international norms and prin-
ciples linked to the idea that states have a responsibility to 
protect their citizens against atrocities and with it the pos-
sibility of armed intervention. The norms and values are still 
developing and in spite the new norms and values may be 
generally accepted at least within the UN Security Council, 
it is not to be neglected that the national interests of the big 
powers will still have a strong impact on world politics in 
many years to come.
Gorm Rye Olsen is a Professor at the Institute of Society and 
Globalization, Roskilde University, Denmark. gormrye@ruc.dk
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The Effects  
of Foreign Aid on 
Democratization: 
Nigeria as  
a Case Study
Aisha Kibwana
There are many reasons why countries give aid. During 
the cold war, aid was given “to prevent friendly governments 
from falling under the influence of unfriendly ones.”1 De-
veloping nations were a battleground for Western capitalist 
and democratic ideology and Soviet communist ideology 
as each sought to expand its influence. Today, foreign aid 
policy has evolved to become more sophisticated and is 
given in a variety of ways such as official development as-
sistance (ODA), concessional loans, and infrastructural 
investments and is channeled through different institutions 
such as a country’s government or directly via civil society 
organizations (CSOs).  
Whether or not aid uplifts underdeveloped nations con-
tinues to be a contentious debate. Additionally, there is no 
globally accepted agreement on what constitutes the differ-
ent components of foreign aid. For example, many ques-
tion whether Chinese assistance to African nations should 
be considered “aid” in the traditional sense since China is 
a non-Development Assistance Committee (non-DAC)2 
country and extends its aid outside of Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regula-
tion.3 Critics of U.S. aid claim “there is little evidence that 
foreign assistance advances U.S. interests.”4 In fact, aid has 
been blamed for exacerbating corruption and worsening 
autocratic behavior in developing nations.5 
Verbatim, in questioning how foreign aid impacts de-
mocratization in nondemocracies categorizes states into one 
of two: that states are either democratic or nondemocratic. 
Yet nations, and especially developing nations, are at dif-
ferent stages of democratization.6 Aid is given to countries 
that are on different points of the democratic spectrum. 
Furthermore, democratization is not a linear process. The 
growth and proliferation of democracy within nations is 
multifaceted affecting different areas of societies in differ-
ent ways. Democracy and governance financing varies by 
political sector/political event, for example elections, political 
parties, and governance. Therefore, the more engaged and 
better financed a political institution is, the more likely it 
is to witness democratic gains. If more financing goes into 
political parties rather than the legislature, for example, 
political parties are likely to do better. Finally, it is difficult 
to measure democratic gains given that some aspects of 
democracy are non-quantifiable and can only be measured 
in the long-term, such as the changes and internalization 
of democratic norms within a population; democratization 
efforts are generally long-term initiatives that may not be 
easily discernible immediately. 
Thus, can “successes” or “failures” be adequately meas-
ured without bias? In failing to contextualize and define 
foreign aid and democratization adequately, and the effect 
of one on the other, we inhibit our ability to better evaluate 
the impact of democratization and are more likely to see 
failures than successes. This paper will examine Nigeria to 
prove the significance of contextualization.
Nigeria: A Nonlinear Multivariate Democracy
In the 1980s, Jean Herskovits wrote in Democracy in 
Nigeria that the Nigerian “government looks remarkably 
familiar to an American.” The handover of government 
from military rule to a civilian government “culminated in 
a change…as smooth as in a Western democracy.” Though 
largely corrupt and accepted as such by global standards, 
Nigeria had taken a revolutionary political step that “intro-
duced democratic local government systems [that brought] 
government closer to the village,” and aimed to “counteract 
the malign effects of ethnic and regional politics.”7 By the 
1990s, according to some, Nigeria’s “authoritarian culture” 
made it impossible for it to become a democratic country. 
The question then became whether or not  “Nigeria [was] 
lacking in fundamental values and principles of democ-
racy.” The excessive corrupt behavior of government officials, 
misuse of public institutions, and gradual “drifting towards 
one-party ‘dictatorship’” was making democratization efforts 
in Nigeria unattainable.8 
Nigeria had a presidential election on 28 March 2015. It 
was an election that many doubted would be a success but 
ultimately exceeded expectations. Liesl Louw-Vaudran, a 
consultant at the Institute for Security Studies, stated the 
elections “went smoother than many had predicted.”9 Bill 
Ritter, an election observer for the Nigerian elections with 
the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(NDI),10 remarked on “the positive attitude of Nigerian 
voters...who were patient, waiting in line for hours to be 
accredited and in a different line again in the afternoon to 
cast their ballot.”11 A Nigerian interviewed by CNN in the 
aftermath of the election had this to say: “The unity in the 
country is very very high. Spirit is high for everything to 
change.”12 
Nigeria as a democratizing country demonstrates non-
linearity of democratization for developing nations. Many 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donors sent 
an election observation mission this past election. For ex-
ample, NDI has run programs in the country and engaged 
Nigerians for years prior to this election.13 NDI has worked 
in collaboration with and engaged Nigerian civil society 
through a variety of programmatic activities. In the most 
recent election, NDI’s partner in Nigeria, the Transition 
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monitoring Group (TMG)—a coalition of over 400 Nigerian 
CSOs—conducted a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) [an 
election observation method that uses random sampling in 
selecting polling stations to observe in order to help verify 
election results] that helped ensure the transparency of and 
confidence in the electoral process.14 The use of social media 
throughout the elections undoubtedly had a serious impact 
on hindering vote rigging and the compromising of bal-
lots.15 The Independent National Electoral Commission 
of Nigeria “adopted technological...innovations aimed at 
raising confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.” 
Electronic readers of biometric permanent voter cards were 
used, though with some malfunctions, to verify voter identity 
with much success.16 There were also peace rallies aimed to 
help quell pre and post-voting violence and extensive state 
driven and donor funded voter education drives.17
Given the nature of these elections and Nigeria’s past as 
a republic, it is difficult to claim that the country has collec-
tively seen either a positive or negative trend as a democracy. 
A corrupt political elite exists in the backdrop, which has 
and continues to manipulate many political processes, even 
with the most recent democratic elections.18 Yet, Nigerians, 
previously thought incapable of espousing democratic ide-
als, decided for themselves that enough is enough as made 
evident by the Twitter hashtag #Nigeriahasdecided. Looking 
at the elections, it is also difficult to quantify what had the 
most impact. Did foreign aid, used on the PVT and voter 
education, help push for the internalization of democratic 
norms and recognition by many Nigerians of their indelible 
right to vote?19 Or, was it social media that helped in enforc-
ing a watchful culture that hampered electoral rigging that 
had the most impact?20 Similar funding efforts went into 
the 2007 elections when Former General Buhari lost due to 
electoral fraud. The process on paper was democratic but in 
reality, was mired in corruption.21 Had the 2015 electoral 
process failed and the country fallen into violence, would 
all the political efforts, though benefitting many citizens, 
be considered a “failure” and therefore the democratization 
process of Nigeria also deemed a failure? Ultimately, Nigeria’s 
peaceful and democratic elections are due to a combination 
of many factors, political and nonpolitical, and not one fac-
tor can be attributed to have largely impacted the process 
without the presence of the other aforementioned factors.
While political spacing can close and open at any given 
time and endemic corruption can severely hamper the 
democratic process, democracy can simultaneously flour-
ish in other aspects of sociopolitical life. Freedom House 
gave Nigeria a 4 and 4.5 freedom rating in 2014 and 2015 
respectively. With this rating, Nigeria is considered “partly 
free” to reflect both existing political and civil liberties in 
some places and lack of in others. This kind of an analysis, 
on the intricacies of democratization, is missing in the aid 
and democratization conversation when aid is discussed at a 
policy level. Herein lies the issue with oversimplification and 
the consequences have real life implications. By generalizing, 
we blind ourselves from seeing the small-scale changes in 
the promotion of democracy. If we oversimplify our analysis 
of democratization, we are not getting the best answers and 
when there are discrepancies in the aid/democratization 
narrative, the impact is felt at the policymaking level. Gen-
eralizing democratic promotion and democratic successes 
or failures can affect the amount of funding that goes into 
development programming and especially democracy and 
governance (D&G) programming.22 
Conclusion
When countries are deemed democratic “failures,” fund-
ing decreases thereby slowing small-scale democratization 
processes, but it is these small processes that can bring about 
gradual change. The lack of sufficient monitoring and evalu-
ation (M&E) frameworks in D&G programming exacerbates 
the problem, as no robust frameworks exist that adequately 
measure democratization.23 Not only is it important to define 
more succinctly what aspects of aid and democratization 
are being asked about at any give time, but it is crucially 
important to accommodate flexible frameworks that allow 
for contextualization and differentiation. It is imperative to 
begin by asking the right questions. 
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U.S. Democracy 
Promotion in Cuba: A 
Three-Pillars Approach
Alessandro Badella
U.S.-Cuba relations have been widely studied from dif-
ferent perspectives and certainly represent a fascinating 
case study in International Relations (IR). However, from 
the perspective of democracy promotion,1 the Cuban case 
deserves more attention. Given that democracy promo-
tion has historically been an important component of U.S. 
foreign policy,2 the growing interest in democracy promo-
tion after the end of the Cold War, has influenced relations 
with Cuba.3 This paper aims to present an analysis of the 
latest U.S. efforts to democratize Cuba in the framework of 
three different “pillars” of U.S. democracy promotion: the 
state-to-state relations, U.S. public diplomacy, and citizen 
diplomacy. As I argue, these three elements are all shaping 
U.S. democracy promotion in recent times, and these three 
“pillars” are vividly present in Obama’s most recent moves 
with Cuba. 
The first pillar: State-to-state relations
U.S.-Cuba state-to-state relations have always been com-
plicated since the imposition of the economic embargo in 
the 1960s4. The presence of a pro-Soviet government (during 
the Cold War) and the absence of democratic elections have 
been necessary conditions to cut state-to-state relations with 
the revolutionary Cuba. However, the lack of formal dip-
lomatic relations has been contrarily tied to the promotion 
of liberal democracy by the U.S. After the codifications of 
1992 and 1996, the Cuban embargo became an instrument 
to impose a “democratic conditionality” in U.S.-Cuba rela-
tions.5  In other words, the U.S. has been using economic 
sanctions over Cuba as a democracy promotion instrument. 
In fact, as Cox and Drury noted, economic sanctions could 
be “democratic,” meaning they could be used by democratic 
countries to target non-democratic states in order to per-
suade the latter to start political and economic reforms that 
would lead to democratization.6 This is the case with Cuba. 
As state-to-state relations are a component of the pro-
moter’s strategy to promote democracy in foreign countries, 
along with the relationship between the promoter(s) and 
the target’s civil society,7 the absence of formal diplomatic 
relations between Cuba and the U.S. (apart from Obama’s 
openings in the last few months) represents a peculiar ele-
ment in U.S. democracy promotion on the island. In fact, the 
embargo has been dominating U.S. top-down approaches 
in democracy promotion in Cuba.8
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The second and third pillars: “public diplomacy” and 
“citizen diplomacy”
The second and third pillars are related to the so called 
“people-to-people’s diplomacy,” or the contacts between U.S. 
government\agencies and citizens with the people of a third 
state (in this case, with the Cuban people, or the Cuban civil 
society). The promotion of civil society in non-democratic 
countries has been part of the Western strategy of democracy 
promotion worldwide.9 Cuba is not an exception. Since the 
1990s, outreach to the Cuban people has been a complemen-
tary strategy to the external economic blockade.10 
These efforts of “people-to-people’s diplomacy” are gen-
erally conducted through local and international NGOs,11 
but also using so called “public diplomacy.” Even if the term 
“public diplomacy” has different meanings and applications 
(especially after the diffusion of the new media and social 
networks) without a solid theoretical framework.12 The con-
cept could be defined as an instrument of soft power13 that 
implies “the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting 
relationships and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and 
policies.”14 In its origin, “public diplomacy” encompassed 
mainly “state-sponsored programs,”15 in which the federal 
agencies were the only actors validated to conduct such ef-
forts to reach out to foreign public opinion. In the Cuban 
case, Radio and Television Martí (based on the previous 
experience of Radio Free Europe) and the USAID programs 
in Cuba can be included in this definition.16
However, the development of international travel and 
communication technologies has gradually disrupted this 
state “monopoly” on “public diplomacy.” This “revolution” 
created a new way to advance a state’s interest among for-
eign public opinion. This is the essence of the so called 
“citizen diplomacy.” Ordinary citizens may have the right, 
the responsibility, or the will to contribute to their country’s 
foreign policy, becoming diplomatic agents themselves, or 
what Mueller (2009) called “citizen diplomats.”17 In the case 
of Cuba, “citizen diplomacy” can be associated with diaspora 
and family (personal and economic) contacts, academic and 
cultural exchanges.18 These are forms of people-to-people’s 
contacts in which the state is responsible for their strate-
gic steering, but it represents more the guarantor for these 
contacts to happen: for example, the U.S. government could 
give American universities the right to activate exchange 
programs in foreign countries (in Cuba like elsewhere in 
the world), but it cannot oblige them to do so, nor can it 
emphasize a political agenda in regards to research or teach-
ing activities abroad.
Three “pillars” in action: U.S. democracy promotion in 
Cuba
Obama’s recent openings to the Cuban government can 
show the development of U.S. democracy promotion in 
Cuba along the three different pillars mentioned above. 
Firstly, Obama’s criticisms to the practice of blocking the 
Cuban economy as a tool to foster a democratic transition 
on the island re-launched a potential political and economic 
engagement of the Cuban government as a way to create a 
friendlier environment for U.S. democracy assistance on the 
island, avoiding further tensions and misunderstandings.19 
These represent probably the most remarkable form of en-
gagement with Havana since the Carter administration.20 
Engaging non-democratic regimes and cultivating friendly 
relations with them in order to promote democracy, the so 
called “transformational diplomacy,”21 has been used with 
Latin American military regimes (both Argentina and Chile 
in the 1970s)  during the Cold War, and it seems that the 
Obama administration is following this approach. Moreo-
ver, the top-down approach has become a complementary 
strategy to the expansion of U.S. “public diplomacy” (or 
the bottom-up approach). In 2010, Hillary Clinton wrote 
that “public diplomacy must start at the top,” highlighting 
the need to fully engage the governments of the country 
that the U.S. wanted to deliver their message to.22 At a more 
general level, this form of engagement could be seen as a 
strategy to refrain from Bush’s vibrant rhetoric on “export-
ing” democracy and the backlash of such a strategy, while 
making democracy promotion more “sustainable” for U.S. 
interests abroad.23 
Under Obama, U.S. democracy promotion strategy in 
Cuba has gradually reconfigured, even if without aban-
doning the role of “public diplomacy,” while opting for a 
reinvigoration of “citizen diplomacy,” which has been con-
sidered a “new” instrument to advance the empowerment 
of Cuban civil society and the transitional process. First of 
all, in recent years, the two main components of U.S. “public 
diplomacy” in Cuba, Radio and Television Martí (RTM) 
and the USAID projects on the island, have been highly 
criticized by federal agencies and congressional services for 
their lack of transparency in the management of funds and 
resources, their ineffectiveness and inefficiency.24 However, 
the Obama administration never completely abandoned 
the way “public diplomacy” operates in Cuba. For example, 
the U.S. administration and Congress never dramatically 
reduce the funding allocated for democracy promotion in 
Cuba through USAID programs and RTM.25 According to 
the last report of the OIG, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting 
still continues to be “engaged in an aggressive campaign 
to distribute weekly its television programming content 
via broadcast, Internet, and even hand-to-hand, via digital 
video disks (DVDs) and flash drives.”26 The main innova-
tion under Obama is related to the “technologization,” and 
the construction of new media infrastructures to help the 
Cuban people communicate with each other. A declassified 
document, dated August 2008, revealed that USAID’s new 
strategy in Cuba “is not telling Cubans how or why they 
need a democratic transition, but rather, the Agency wants 
to provide the technology and means for communicating the 
spark which could benefit the population.”27 Projects such 
as (the aborted) Zunzuneo28 and (the currently running) 
Piramideo29 revealed the attention of U.S. agencies to the 
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construction of such infrastructures. Under Obama, some 
U.S. corporations received million dollar contracts to run 
these activities.30 
Furthermore, the more significant change happened 
in the realm of “citizen diplomacy.” Obama inaugurated 
(in 2009 and 2011, and then in late 2014) the relaxation of 
travel and remittance rules to the island as a tool to further 
advance the empowerment of the Cuban civil society. In fact, 
according to Obama, “measures that decrease dependency 
of the Cuban people on the Castro regime and that promote 
contacts between Cuban-Americans and their relatives are 
means to encourage positive change in Cuba.”31 Obama’s 
“citizen diplomacy” towards Cuba was revealed at its best 
in his December 17 speech. The announced changes in 
U.S. policy were presented as a striking modification of the 
American stance over “the Cuban people” and this term 
seems intentional. Moreover, in the same speech, Obama 
wished for the participation of representatives from Cuban 
civil society at the next Summit of the Americas in 2015, 
while he made clear that the U.S. would “continue to sup-
port civil society there.”32 In other words, the main target 
for the U.S. in the (updated) relations with Cuba is Cuban 
civil society and Obama’s changes were presented as a way to 
“further engage and empower the Cuban people”33 through 
the use of expanded channels of communication with the 
island, such as remittances and family travels. 
In conclusion, the U.S. is not giving up the commitment 
to promote democracy on the island,34 even U.S. democracy 
promotion in Cuba under Obama is facing a strong evolution 
in all the above mentioned “pillars.” Despite the evaluation 
of the (in)efficacy of such a strategy,35 Obama’s evolution 
in democracy aid to Cuba implies a more cautious but also 
“variegated” strategy to engage the Cuban government on 
issues of common interest and the Cuban people separately.
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and extended analysis of the relevance and strategy of US democracy 
promotion under Obama, see Thomas Carothers, “Barack Obama.” In 
US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to 
Barack Obama (London: Routledge, 2013): 196-213.  
35  For a criticism about the inefficacy of the “liberal deal” with Cuba 
(relaxing the economic pressure in exchange for political and economic 
reforms in Cuba) see Gordon Adams, “The Liberal Fallacy of the 
Cuba Deal.” Foreign Policy, 19 December 2014, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2014/12/19/the-liberal-fallacy-of-the-cuba-deal-us-castros/ (date 
accessed: 20 March 2015). Morevoer, the literature seems to be cautious 
on evaluating positively the effects of people-to-people’s contacts and the 
remittances on the democratization and economic liberalization process: 
the determinant influence of such contacts could be asserted only in 
the presence of certain conditions, see Tobias Pfutze, “Does Migration 
Promote Democratization? Evidence from the Mexican Transition.” Journal 
of Comparative Economics 40, no. 2 (May 2012): 159-175; Tobias Pfutze, 
“Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International 
Migration.” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 2 (June 2014): 295-307; 
Angela O’Mahony, “Political Investment: Remittances and Elections”, British 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 43, n. 4, ottobre 2013, pp. 799-820; Clarisa 
Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow, “Do Migrants Remit Democracy? 
International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behaviour in Mexico.” 
12
Georgetown University | The Center for Democracy and Civil Society
DEMOCRACY, INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, AND FOREIGN AID
Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 1, (February 2009): 119-148; Abel 
Escribá–Folch and others “Remittances and Democratization”, Pennsylvania 
State University, January 2013, http://www.upf.edu/pdi/escriba-folch/_pdf/
Escriba_Remittances.pdf (date accessed: 20 March 2015). As some scholars 
recalled, the effects of the Cuban-American remittances to the island is not 
an exception, as they could foster divisions or grant benefits both to the 
independent civil society and the Cuban government, see Susan Eckstein, 
“Remittances and Their Unintended Consequences in Cuba.” World 
Development 38, no. 7 (July 2010): 1047-1055. 
Book review
Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations 
of Poor Countries by M. A. Thomas, 
Columbia University Press, 2015
Review by Erum Haider 
At the end of the Berlin Confer-
ence in 1885, territories in Af-
rica acquired uncontested 
boundaries that were under 
sovereign control of individual 
European powers. Many of these 
paper states amounted to little 
more than a port at the edge of 
the continent or along a river, 
and a few roads linking strategic 
posts. A single colonial offic-
er — typically a young unmar-
ried man — often embodied the 
colonial state, with oversight over a territory the size of a 
“large or medium English county.” Well over a century later, 
a World Bank staffer asks the author whether she has seen 
the Ministry of Finance of South Sudan: “It’s a guy. In a 
trailer. Yet somehow everyone expects him to do everything 
that a ministry of finance does.”
M.A. Thomas’ Govern Like Us is a story of South Sudan’s 
guy-in-a-trailer and others like him in the developing world. 
It begins, however, with his colonial predecessor. The appeal 
of Govern Like Us is precisely the political and historical con-
text Thomas brings to what is essentially a practitioners book. 
Poor governments govern differently. Often, they govern 
poorly.  This simple observation nonetheless enables us to 
peer deeply into the state, a category that is remarkable for 
its versatility and ultimately its hollowness. States are sov-
ereign territories, argues Thomas, but many of the poorest 
states inherited territories before they inherited sovereignty. 
Thomas’ volume reverberates with the work of Weber, Tilly 
and Herbst, which is possibly why this study is exciting and 
frustrating in equal measure. She’s a political scientist and 
a policy practitioner, and inevitably must sacrifice one for 
the other. 
States, beginning with the colonial state, employ mixed 
strategies to control territories where sovereignty was not 
built from the bottom up. These include coercion, but also 
patronage. The pre-Revolution state in France under King 
Francis I regularly created and sold bureaucratic positions 
to generate revenue, Thomas suggests political actors in 
industrialized countries also maintain careful ledgers of 
favors. Patronage radiates from these centers, this study 
suggests only that in poor countries, it radiates further. 
Several political economists (LSE’s Mushtaq Khan comes to 
mind) confirm empirically that rent-seeking closes the gap 
between the market value for public goods and services and 
the heavily subsidized rate most governments in developing 
countries offer services at. One of Thomas’ central claims 
is that we have yet to evaluate the true “cost” of govern-
ance — how much would it cost to provide universal edu-
cation, for example — so it is impossible to know just how 
great the shortfall is. This makes her ultimate argument, that 
poor governments need more revenue, all the more puzzling. 
Thomas clearly prefers “patronage” and “clientalism,” 
which are universally applicable, to the more squarely Third-
World “corruption.” Good research has shown that govern-
ment shortfalls in health and education are regularly made 
up with cheap private services. The more troubling scenario 
is when groups are excluded from limited government re-
sources on non-monetary basis: caste, race, ethnicity and 
gender. In Thomas’ dissection of the corruption of poor 
states, the power imbalance between patrons and clients is 
lost. The theorist might wonder at post-Enlightenment ideals 
of equal and free access to safety, justice and basic needs that 
are demanded of states that are patently unable to govern 
more than a few kilometers outside the capital city. The 
practitioner, it seems, faces another dilemma entirely: that 
of funneling billions of dollars into this staggeringly broken 
system. Which really leads to Thomas’ solution to any of 
these problems, each more unpalatable than the last. Her call 
to destigmatize, or at least decriminalize, poor governance 
is certainly commendable. And she is simultaneously aware 
that some poor states govern better than many middle-
income states, and that rewarding one while punishing the 
other isn’t straightforward. Ultimately her hope of finding a 
“more modest, people-centered approach” involving “like-
minded partners” in poor states resonates with much the 
same hollowness that led us here in the first place. There is 
little engagement of the politics — the indigenous, people-
driven politics — that form states. While her grasp of the 
history of the French bureaucracy makes for a vivid read, 
the story of the peasantry that ultimately rebelled against the 
unjust system and formed the modern democratic French 
state slips through. Although her engagement with colonial 
politics infuses what would’ve been an arid policy-centric 
book with fresh air, the messy political process of decoloniza-
tion, democratization and state formation (none of which, 
incidentally, required USAID funding) is lost.
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That such a book needs to be written at all is a sobering 
reminder of the gulf that separates practitioners of devel-
opment from the fundamentals of political and economic 
history. While Thomas does a commendable job of distilling 
some basic context of the countries the international aid 
sector operates in, a crucial — perhaps the crucial — missing 
link is the murky bureaucracy of international aid itself. An 
industry fueled by powerful states, that finds itself unable 
to account for its own spending in the developing world. 
In chapter seven, for example, Thomas notes that Ethiopia 
announced the purchase of a fleet of battle tanks a day after 
the UK foreign office announced a $60 million “emergency 
food aid donation.” A reader might be tempted to interro-
gate the donors — if you’re going to run the country, why 
don’t you run the country? The answer, extrapolating from 
Thomas’ own investigation, is incentives. Donor countries 
may be well aware of what it would cost to rid the world 
of malaria, but may simply lack the incentive to do so. The 
people who are hired to implement these multi-billion dollar 
aid programs — the practitioners — may not necessarily lack 
the knowledge it takes to fix the system. They may, in fact, 
be entirely aware of the inconsistencies and the dangerous, 
distorted incentives it takes to keep the international aid 
and foreign policy machine chugging along. 
Erum Haider is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of 
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perceptions of democracy against levels of democracy and 
governance aid allocation. This paper argues that foreign 
democracy aid channeled through civil society organiza-
tions is associated with increased rates of public acceptance 
of democracy within the region.    
Democracy Aid and Regime Change: A Complex 
Relationship
Since the Third Wave of Democracy, scholars have in-
creasingly sought to gauge the effectiveness of the Western 
countries’ influence on foreign polities through different 
types of aid. While a well-known study by Knack (2004) 
found no relationship between foreign aid and Freedom 
House or Polity IV scores, more detailed and rigorously 
tested efforts3 have since suggested that foreign aid is often 
positively related to a developing country’s movement to-
wards democracy.4 The efficacy of democracy aid per dollar 
may differ significantly depending not only on the spe-
cific political and economic characteristics of the recipient 
country, but also on the global political climate, the donor 
country, and whether the recipient also receives competing 
aid packages from non-Western sources. The myriad of 
influencing factors is also complicated by the difficulty of 
accurately observing, measuring, and comparing tangible 
change within the democratic institutions and public at-
titudes of a country.
While there is no convincing consensus relating to the 
efficacy of democracy aid, scholars have generally found 
that over the long-term, democracy and governance fund-
ing may indeed be directing developing countries towards 
democracy. One finding suggests that a 100 percent increase 
in democracy aid, on average, is associated with a 1.6 per-
cent increase in Polity scores by country years.5 Another 
analysis using Freedom House scores finds that, on average, 
a doubling of democratic assistance is associated with a 7 
percent increase in a country’s democracy score over a 25-
year period.6 Quantitative analysis has also suggested that 
democracy aid has been more effective in the Post-Cold 
War period, that countries experience diminishing marginal 
returns to democracy aid as they become more democratic, 
and that increased aid from non-Western sources is generally 
associated with democratic recession.7     
Democratic Shifts in Sub-Saharan Africa
In general, there are two avenues for affecting regime 
change through foreign aid. The conditioning of any type 
of aid (most commonly attached to multiparty elections and 
human rights standards) represents one of these avenues. 
The other main vehicle for change is the direct investment 
in democracy promotion through the funding of programs 
typically centered on governance building and civil society 
support.8 Sub-Saharan Africa has historically remained heav-
ily reliant on foreign aid, which creates the opportunity for 
what Levitsky and Way (2010) call high levels of Leverage 
between Western donors and many countries within the 
region.9 Largely due to the conditioning of Western aid to 
the holding of multi-party elections, the number of self pro-
claimed single-party systems fell from 29 to 0 between 1989 
and 1994, as autocratic leaders repositioned their regimes 
for the post-Cold War era.10 The number of elections held 
per year has also proliferated at an astounding rate. From 
1960-1989, the continent held less than one election per 
year on average, but from 1990-2012, that figure jumped to 
almost seven.11 However, this expansion in electoral activ-
ity has not been matched by an equal increase in political 
competition.12 
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The direct impact of funds assigned to democracy and 
governance programs is more challenging to observe in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In one analysis Goldsmith (2001) finds 
a positive but miniscule relationship between governance 
funding and decreased rates of corruption in the region.15 
Research has also shown that an increase in democracy aid 
is tied to lower rates of electoral misconduct.16 Dietrich 
(2013) observed that more recently donors are increasing 
their support to African civil society groups, largely due to 
concerns of inadvertently strengthening authoritarian state 
structures in the context of hybrid regimes.17 However, as 
the second column of Table 1 shows, civil society spending 
still makes up only 8.19 percent of the total democracy aid in 
the Sub-Saharan African countries examined, with the vast 
majority of democracy aid (84.44 percent) going towards 
government capacity building. The third column of Table 
1 shows that all democracy and governance aid represents 
just 14.64 percent of overall foreign aid to these countries, 
with civil society funding representing 1.24 percent of total 
foreign assistance.  
Friesen, Continued from Page 1
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The Supply and Demand of Democracy 
In order to approach the quandary of democracy aid 
effectiveness from a fresh viewpoint, this paper replaces the 
heavily relied upon Freedom House and Polity democracy 
indicators in search of new variables that also attempt to cap-
ture movements from or towards democracy. Scholars from 
the Afrobarometer, an African-led public opinion research 
organization, have developed alternative measurements to 
examine the prevalence of democratic ideals and perceptions 
of democratic institutions in African countries. By utilizing 
these data from a selection of African countries,18 changes 
in public opinion may be compared alongside variations in 
funding from international donors. Instead of relying on 
expert opinion, this method captures the extent to which 
Africans actually desire and observe regime change over 
time. In the way, public opinion may be used to triangu-
late expert rankings of regime change since both types of 
measurements exhibit differing methodological vulnerabili-
ties. By compiling data from questions regarding popular 
support for democracy as well as the rejection of military, 
one-party, and dictatorial regimes, the Afrobarometer team 
has developed a new measurement called Demand for De-
mocracy. In a similar fashion, survey questions relating to 
the public’s perceived extent of democracy and satisfaction 
with democratic institutions are indexed into a country’s 
Supply of Democracy.19 
While regression testing is unavailable due to the small 
sample size, changes in the supply and demand of democracy 
for twelve countries from 2001-2011 and four countries from 
2003-2011 are compared to levels of funding by specific aid 
sectors relating to democracy and governance promotion 
through the use of the aiddata database.20 In the spirit of 
a quasi-pre-test/post-test experiment, this allows for some 
control over specific country characteristics such as religious 
and ethnic make-up, population size, land size, natural re-
sources and other slow-moving or fixed variables. While 
several alternative explanations for the recorded shifts in 
the supply and demand of democracy remain absent from 
this analysis, the specificity of these instruments provides 
argument for a relationship between certain types of democ-
racy aid and the observed changes of democratic supply and 
demand. Using regression analysis, Bratton (2012) discov-
ers that the public’s perception of the state of the economy, 
freedom of expression, and fairness of the previous election 
are all significantly and positively related to the supply of 
democracy in the Afrobarometer surveyed countries.21 
One may hypothesize that higher levels of democracy 
aid would support increases in both the supply and demand 
of democratic institutions. Table 2 displays the changes in 
both demand and supply of democracy for the sixteen coun-
tries examined, along with the amount of dollars per capita 
that each country received from 2001-2010 in civil society 
strengthening and government capacity building. Coun-
tries with large populations like South Africa and Nigeria 
Table 2: Supply and Demand Changes compared to Aid Allocation per Capita
2001-2011
Civil Society Spending 
per Capita (USD)




Demand for Democracy 
Change
Cape Verde* 22.59 640.45 +17.5% +11.5%
Zimbabwe 22.12 5.22 +8.5% +4.0%
Zambia 14.38 171.72 +12.0% +7.8%
Malawi 13.56 98.84 -5.0% +3.0%
Mali 12.77 164.51 -19% +0.3%
Lesotho 12.57 172.32 +12.5% +14.0%
Mozambique* 11.43 199.84 -14.5% +11.3%
Tanzania 11.41 189.56 +19.0% -0.2%
Ghana 9.81 214.64 +15.0% +5.3%
Senegal* 9.78 84.62 +11.0% +11.8%
Uganda 9.29 98.29 -3.5% +13.8%
Namibia 8.23 37.50 +1.0% +16.0%
Kenya* 7.50 37.89 -33.0% -6.3%
South Africa 6.39 8.04 +6.0% +5.0%
Botswana 3.99 823.64 -3.5% +1.3%
Nigeria 1.63 8.44 -29.0% -7.0%
Average 12.54 184.72 -0.3% 5.6%
*2003-2011 only due to data availability
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experience low levels of aid per capita, while countries with 
smaller populations like Botswana and Cape Verde received 
around one hundred times the amount government support 
funding per person. Civil society aid also follows this same 
trend, but to a lesser extent. In Zimbabwe, donors clearly saw 
a strategic opportunity to subvert the authoritarian regime 
by investing a significant amount of funding in civil society 
organizations, while virtually cutting off direct government 
support. The countries with more advance economies and 
higher democracy rankings within the group (South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia) received fairly low levels of civil society 
spending. 
In regards to shifts in the supply of democracy over 
2001/2003-2011, Kenya and Nigeria especially see significant 
decreases, likely due to the occurrence of serious destabiliza-
tion and political-motivated violence surrounding elections 
in each country over this period.22 Decreases in demand 
for democracy are also observed in each of these countries, 
as citizens absorbs the harsh reality of violence and power 
struggle surrounding competitive elections. Across the six-
teen countries, citizens’ confidence in the vitality of their 
democratic institutions stagnated over the decade with the 
supply of democracy decreasing by 0.3 percent; however, 
public demand for democracy increased on average by 5.6 
percent. The static trend observed in the supply of democracy 
variable over this period reflects a larger phenomenon, as 
worldwide Freedom House scores have plateaued worldwide 
since around 2006.23  
Though each of the examined countries were subject to 
a variety of unique political, economic, and social circum-
stances over this period of time, civil society funding is 
shown to have a strong connection with the Afrobarometer 
data as displayed in Chart 1. The general trend shows that as 
civil society spending per capita increases, the change in de-
mand for democracy by citizens is also expected to increase. 
The relationship between these two variables is correlated 
at 0.61 (p<0.05), and change in the perceptions of supply 
of democracy is also positively correlated with civil society 
spending at 0.40, but just fails to reach a meaningful level of 
significance at the p<0.10 level. Not surprisingly, the changes 
in the supply and demand of democracy are also strongly 
associated with one another, exhibiting a correlation of 0.55 
(p<0.05). These findings greatly suggest that civil society aid 
bolsters citizens’ backing of democracy.
Chart 2: Civil Society Spending per Capita
Chart 2 demonstrates these findings by displaying the 
average levels of civil society aid per capita on the vertical 
axis in dollars. On the horizontal axis countries are sepa-
rated into groups that experienced either an increase or 
decrease on the supply and demand indexes. On average, 
countries whose citizens’ believe their country has moved 
away from democracy between 2001-2011, received an 
average of $8.90 per capita of civil society spending from 
foreign donors. In comparison, countries whose citizens’ 
believed their country was moving 
towards democracy received an av-
erage of $15.38. A t-test confirms 
that the difference between these 
groups is statically significant at the 
p<0.05 level. In a similar manner, 
the three countries that experienced 
a decrease in demand of democracy 
over the same period received an 
average of $7.83 per capita of civil 
society spending, compared to an 
average of $13.63 across the other 
thirteen countries that observed an 
increase in demand. 
Aid from the other sectors that 
are generally considered as demo-
cratic aid (Legislature and Political 
Parties, Legal and Judicial, Local 
Government, Government Capacity 
Building) fail to see any meaningful 
Chart 1- Civil Society Spending per Capita and 
Changes in Demand of Democracy
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correlations with shifts in the either the supply or demand of 
democracy across the sixteen countries. As observed in Table 
1, three of these funding categories: Legislature and Political 
Parties, Legal and Judicial, and Local Government represent 
a minute portion of total foreign aid to Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Meanwhile, government capacity building aid 
does not exhibit any meaningful relationship with either 
the supply or demand indicators even though this sector is 
well funded. Aid allocated for this purpose may potentially 
slow democratic consolidation through the strengthening 
of incumbent rulers, or perhaps citizens do not directly 
observer or associate state building with democratic con-
solidation. Either way, the findings presented here suggest 
that foreign donors have received stronger returns in terms 
of democracy promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa through 
civil society support. 
Conclusion
A host of country-specific characteristics create a chal-
lenging set of circumstances for understanding the ef-
fectiveness of democracy aid. Several studies have shown 
that democracy aid is strategically allocated to countries 
depending on the country’s economic conditions, history 
of colonization, level of democratic consolidation, as well 
as the strategic importance of the recipient country to the 
donor country. Furthermore, matters including a govern-
ment’s level of corruption, the existence of basic democratic 
institutions, and the recipient’s dependence on aid may all 
influence the effectiveness of democratic promotion. Though 
scholars point to a worldwide “Democratic Recession” since 
the mid-2000s, public opinion research also shows that 
African citizens are, on average, demanding more effective 
democratic institutions across the continent. The correla-
tions found between measures of both democratic supply 
and demand in Sub-Saharan Africa and higher rates of civil 
society funding provides a strong argument for donors to 
continue supporting this sector as an effective instrument 
for democratic change.  
Paul Friesen is a Program Assistant for Southern and East Africa 
at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. He is 
a former research assistant at the Afrobarometer and holds a M.P.P. 
with a specialization in International Development from Michigan 
State University.
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 ✥ On January 30th, 2015 
Ann Weber, D&G class of 
2016, organized an “Insider 
Tour” of the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum for stu-
dents. The group met with 
Museum staff involved in 
international outreach pro-
grams and genocide pre-
vention work, including 
initiatives to combat anti-
semitism in Eastern Europe 
and the MENA region, State 
Department visits, creation of an upcoming exhibit on mass 
atrocities in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, genocide 
prevention work with US and international military, and an 
early warning system for genocide prevention.
 ✥ On February 11th, 2015 the Democracy and Governance 
Program in partnership with the African Studies Program 
hosted former president of Ethiopia Dr. Negasso Solan. 
Dr. Solan, a NED Fellow, delivered a talk titled The Role 
of Democracy Building in a Multi-Ethnic State: The Case of 
Ethiopia. 
 ✥ On March 23rd, 2015 Prof. Josep Colomer delivered a talk 
on his recent book, How Global Institutions Rule the World. 
The book examines the ability of international institutions 
to make decisions and their compatibility with democratic 
principles. 
 ✥ On March 26th, 2015 the Democracy and Governance 
Program welcomed its accepted students to our annual 
Open House. We were pleased to have Robert Benjamin, 
senior associate and the regional director of Central and 
Eastern Europe programs at the National Democratic In-
stitute join us. 
 ✥ May 15, 2015 was the Georgetown Graduate School’s 
Commencement Ceremony. We were extremely proud to 
graduate the following students: Ugur Altundal, Jie Bai, 
Emily Kehrt, Matthew Mainuli, Kellen McClure, Maria 
Regina Reis, Weiyi Wang, Zhichao Yi, and Yu Zhang.
 ✥ The Democracy and Governance Advisory Board held 
its inaugural meeting in January. The board brings together 
some of the best individuals from the democracy promotion 
and international development community. The current 
members are Shari Bryan (Vice President, NDI), Thomas 
Garrett (Vice President, IRI), Larry Cooley (President, 
MSI), Eric Bjornlund (Principal, DI), Thomas Carothers 
(Carnegie Endowment), Beatriz Casals (Founder, Casals 
and Associates), and Amb. Donald Planty (Founder, Planty 
and Associates). The board discussed ways to maintain the 
prominence of the program as the premier host for democ-
racy and governance studies, and ways to ensure that our 
curriculum matches the job market needs. 
 ✥ The program’s inaugural USAID study group concluded 
its research and delivered its findings this spring. Under 
the tutelage of Prof. Jeff Fischer, five students (Jie Bai ‘15, 
Sibghat Ullah ’16, Tyler Knarr ’16, Javier Pena ’16, and 
Cabell Willis ’16) delved into the causes and reactions to 
electoral violence. Their results can be found at: https://
government.georgetown.edu/node/1441. 
 ✥ A new Executive Education initiative was created by 
the Democracy and Governance program. In an effort to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice even further, 
there are now new summer short course offerings on the 
theme of Electoral Integrity. There are currently three short 
courses on the topics of Election Technology, Election Vio-
lence, and Election Malpractice. Each lasts two full days and 
combines theoretic and practitioner perspectives. More 
information can be found at: https://government.george-
town.edu/democracy-and-governance/executive-education. 
 ✥ D&G Program welcomes Dr. Georges Fauriol as the 
instructor for GOVT 550: Democracy Promotion. Dr. Fau-
riol is currently the Vice President of Programs - Planning, 
Grants Management, Compliance, and Evaluation at the 
National Endowment for Democracy. He is also a former 
Senior Vice President and Acting President at the Interna-
tional Republican Institute.
Faculty Awards and Publications
 ✥ Prof. Yonatan L. Morse received the Harold N. Glass-
man Award from Georgetown University for his dissertation 
Party Matters: The Sources of Regime Competitiveness and 
Hegemony in Post Cold War Africa. 
Student and Alumni News
 ✥ Andrew Mandelbaum, D&G class of 2008, has co-
founded the Moroccan non-profit SimSim-Participation 
Citoyenne. The organization is implementing the second 
year of its Nouabook.ma project, which helps citizens ask 
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Democratic Backsliding and 
Authoritarian Resurgence
Since the end of the Cold War, the performance of nas-
cent democracies has been the primary focus of political 
scientists around the world. This paradigm shift has 
produced a new body of research that recognizes the 
growing resurgence in authoritarian-type regimes that 
threaten democratic development in their respective 
countries. Given the unsuccessful democratic outcomes 
in states with recently deposed regimes, is the world in a 
state of “democratic decline,” as some experts warn? With 
the Arab spring and South Asian cases in mind, should 
observers be pessimistic about the current condition 
of democratization? Also, with major actors like China 
and Russia openly pursuing nondemocratic policies, 
how can we assess the role of authoritarian politics on 
the international and domestic levels?
We are seeking articles that address the following 
questions:
“Hybrid Regimes” and the Democratic Grey 
Area
How do autocrats use features of democracy to pre-
serve their power, such as elections or courts? What 
institutional factors can make states susceptible to demo-
cratic erosion? Is it useful to analyze cases in terms of 
“democratic-ness” and is further research necessary for 
conceptual clarity?
Protest, Oppositions, and Response
How do alienated populations express their op-
position to a regime through various modes of Civil 
Society? Are protest movements more successful when 
they promote democratic principles or are organized 
into formal political parties? What can we learn from 
response tactics perpetrated by incumbent regimes? 
The Military as an Arbitrator 
What can we draw from the historically salient rela-
tionship between militaries and authoritarianism? What 
incentives may be present that influence armed forces to 
keep their distance from politics or openly seize power?
International Relations and Modern 
Authoritarianism
Do autocratic governments face strained relation-
ships with democracies? How is international diplomacy 
affected by the politics of a dictatorial or “hybrid” re-
gime? What can we discern about the continued power 
of states that reject democracy as a preferred form of 
government (I.E., China, Russia, Turkey, etc.)?  
Variations on these themes will be accepted, as well 
as research that is relevant to these themes. 
Please visit, https://government.georgetown.edu/
democracy-and-society for more information about 
Democracy & Society and http://government.george-
town.edu/cdacs for more information about the M.A. 
in Democracy and Governance and the Center for De-
mocracy and Civil Society.
questions to their members of Parliament, and encourages 
the latter to respond online and in public.
 ✥ Mariel Leonard, D&G class of 2011, presented a poster 
on “Achieving Post-Conflict Stability Through Civil Soci-
ety” at the APSA Political Networks conference in Portland 
Oregon on June 17, 2015. She is a part of a team of research-
ers at Westat that is conducting on-going research into the 
prevalence of honor-based violence in the US.
 ✥ David Jandura, D&G class of 2011, is currently based 
in Tunis, Tunisia, providing direct technical assistance to 
Libyan civil society and constitution drafters, in Libya’s con-
stitution drafting process.
 ✥ Yuan Li, D&G class of 2012, currently serves as Center 
Manager for the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public 
Policy (Brookings Institution).  Before joining Brookings, 
Yuan Li worked as a research assistant at the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars.
 ✥ Andrea Murta, D&G class of 2013, left PwC and since 
January she is the head of the Americas at the Business 
Intelligence division of a company called The Risk Advi-
sory Group (www.riskadvisory.net). She coordinates the 
anti-corruption corporate investigations in the Americas 
over here.
 ✥ Pablo Estrada, D&G class of 2014, works since Septem-
ber 2014 as advisor to Counselor Benito Nacif in Mexico’s 
National Electoral Institute. He attends issues related to the 
administration of the Institute, regulation of electoral polls 
and surveys, and the organization of electoral processes. 
As well, during falls he teaches the course “Sociology and 
political science” to BA in International Relations students 
at Anáhuac University.
Center for Democracy and Civil Society
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Washington, D.C. 20007
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